>> [inaudible conversations] welcome to the hudson institute i am a senior fellow for the center for

common culture promoting it american leadership promoting the engagement for a secure and free and prosperous future founded in 1961 by strategist -- hoping to stir have strategic feet -- the disciplinary studies with international relations and economics health care and technology. we are delighted to host british journalist david good part. and from of think tank the founder of prospect magazine and global director from the most. his previous book was a runner-up and has written a parcelled new book called the road to somewhere.

you can get that on amazon of course, just like britain and united states is a culturally divided nation to have the same cogent arguments looking at the crucial issues of immigration and a civilization -- assimilation and globalization. they're not used to being criticized as a man of considerable courage with the overview will repeat -- appear in "national review" but my good colleague will have an exchange with david with after his presentation. the road to summer will have a positive impact of the policy debate in the english-speaking world, david goodhart taken away. >> thanks for the generous

introduction i have only just discovered power point. there we go. i wrote this book about the value of british society to have a bearing on several developed democracies including the united states but the values divided britain as a destabilizing effect that led to the very unexpected vote to leave the european union. the very fact it was such a

shock is testament in some ways to the different bubbles that the people live in in our country as in most democracies you will be very familiar since bremer with the parties in europe in this area but my analysis is focused on those education divides some of what i say will be quite familiar with those distinctive lines of argument. but why is this happening now? because these education divides have been with us over many generations. why do we see this now? so

how do we move on? so i will give you a thumbnail sketch of the of values divide that i am talking about with the u. k better broader contingence but the people from anywhere that by 2025 that population is not only by the metropolitan elite the group that has become a lot bigger highly educated, they are mobile and the combination of the two because most of it is under the influence of london. those that such give so many people in careers.

so you have the educated and mobile group is and we tend to value openness and social change and fluidity and because of mobility they tend to have weak attachments to places or groups. and this of course is contrasted with the other large value blocks in our society of people that our more rigid and less educated with that value or familiarity your security the also stronger group of attachments to place and their own people.

there is a parallel by very concept that helps to flesh out my distinction that comes from an american and the have mentioned is the review times but people flinch end he did produce great chemistry text books but he did come up with one useful binary between itchy began describing devotees. any of those amenities that are achieved that comes from what they have achieved in

life. university, successful professional careers, that'd is relatively protected. but equally otherwise it is a prescribed to identity but if you come from some place you belong to a certain group were to be disturbed or word does comforted by rapid social change these is a very important distinction and when talking about stability of politics because in some ways with a social change and the attachment to groups is much stronger.

so this may sound a little too simplistic and in some respects it is when you have a thesis to boil it down to something simple but if you read my book you will find plenty and there is a huge variety of types on the spectrum they are more extreme or three or 5 percent of the population with that global identity is all but eccentric group then those authoritarian its -- better in a war against the modern world. also i talked of a very

large group 25% and two things i would say. i have not invented that value block. but if you look at us strategy or the whole range of opinions over the last decade and to interrogate the surveys roughly will find those proportions that i have attributed to those various subgroups and that whole value argument chefs but there really are there

in the data. both of these groups are legitimate with the mainstream variations and therein lies a the tragedies of life because in some respects fundamentally opposed. know i will hop over the sliding come back briefly touched on the question of why now? to think they're always better educated those who have more experience in the world who had a fever

and that is true there are important reasons why this emerges now. the first reason for the u.k. and much of europe we have shifted that have been almost entirely dominated postwar from the economic framework the arguments about the quality and inequality and those of not completely gone away by any means. and even with that election a few weeks ago in britain takes us back to the left or right to zero or two-party system and we can talk about this later but that analysis

that still worked very well when applied. so we see the aversions of the go up -- of this toshio cultural politics socio-cultural politics and this is response to our economies and culture. with globalization with the european union integration with the much more external integration that people had of reductions.

to the rise of social row politics -- socio-cultural but also you have seen a simple increase itself a product a huge expansion in old story on -- in the u.s.. will hold rise of socio-cultural politics because of race and religion in u.s. politics over the many centuries. but even so here it is it even reverse order as they return to a special class politics your in america we are worried more dealing with boundaries they and and

the city - - ethnicity that we're more familiar. but this has helped to magnify those valley divisions leading to this instability of the surprises brexit vote. so yes with value divides and politics the anywhere value group has come more

and more to dominate politics and policy with that loose political ideology of political of the center-right those value groups in general are all the same thing even those that would sell to finance the working class were to be affluent or middle-class and there are some working class. but they overlap in their distinct categories and that divided is even more now from those traditional

social class positions. but one absolutely vital point is that one thing that has led to the disillusionment is to withdraw from politics from quite a large section of the somewhere value block the failure of the anywheres to understand your sufficient emotional intelligence to understand those somewhere values to be liberal or receive a full deck -- zero full beckon some people think that is a contradiction of terms because that somewhere grow -- group with a greater

liberalization if you would get that strategy, going back to the '80s what now seems like extraordinary reactionary reviews to the everyday cultural life in britain in the mid-80s that bought homosexuality was morally wrong. with a huge liberalization in the united states with sexuality in the u.k. it is not that lead type of movement but they are not liberals so they still have

much stronger national attachments in that benefit for example, broadly speaking opposed to large scale emigrations that for them to take such and such a party of from the anti-immigrant there anti-a large scale immigration through the rapid social change that most people don't want. so this could have been different going back to the '60s or '70s there were much more bigoted attitudes about sending people home but now

it is the rate of the flow of the people so some ways a stronger attachment to the common social mores with the integration of minorities or welfare free rides to have traditional old-fashioned views like a compromise of a modified gender division of labor. mike of the goal egalitarian androgynous models let when it comes to family responsibilities of large portion of women one day large breadwinner mail when they have children they want to bring up, jr. without

having to work but yet they make it almost impossible for people to spend time. so i want to stress that and yet the alienation is the defining factor in the populist surge. so that domination of our society of anywhere priorities. with 40 or 50 years with a country like britain with british common sense now

overwhelmingly you go through the main policy areas of british life, so it tells you how things have changed to be highly educated and highly qualified. so we have seen the emergence of this labor market to give status and protection where goes to the countries in the automated way. one of the absolutely fundamental causes of this economic analysis like the culture for trump economics is more intertwined when

we've talked about the reduced production in the status of those that somebody said to me we tend to romanticize the skilled manual jobs from the large manufacturing enterprises. i found something burial in the inning he said my a job i used to do did not need a lot of cognitive ability to do well but you did the experience so they cannot just walk off the street and into my job. but that since of experience

gave use that as protection the so much of that is gone in the labor market. but so much so that about 8085% of the jobs in the u.k. that all can be do after half an hour training. so the central fact is the rise of cognitive ability as the gold standard. this is a long argument central to the political debate the rise of the of meritocracy that critique of society of the of modern paternalistic cognitive

elite who think they know nothing this is the opposite of the upper journalist in this is part of the famous book with the bell curve but as you mentioned the book is about the problem of the cognitive deletes -- elite so with the economy economy, education policy policy, as huge focus on higher education with an area that anybody in the stands in university.

meanwhile the continuing neglect and those options that all of the public subsidies is pushing people into the higher education wrote. we simply have had a huge opening of our economies and the promises that were made with that new labor promise was associated with clinton in the united states and britain and said world globalization will be fine

we will trade you and the promise was never fulfilled. so if you take freedom of movement one of the biggest reasons and think of how differently it affects living in north london as a lawyer with offices in berlin and amsterdam so with any bureaucratic bother you don't face complication in that food production and sector it is a different story. imprint employed 400,000 people but - - 50,000 have come from central europe just from 2004.

so they probably will be a factor and public services and so one. so with that aptitude or the desire. why would you? i did touch on the previously it has been dominated by interest of all the professional couples completely legitimate causes with the moderate and average men no question about that. but meanwhile with all the

focus of that area of disintegrating also in parts of the u.s. so people breaking up children together that is pretty fundamental for historical reasons they spend far more time helping though lower or middle income families in this potentially is a popular policy for family life as a cultural bias is

one of the things that i have learned in this book that surprised me just how far they have gone so i asked and in turn, the european leaders with the do prime minister in ireland 49 of 30 european leaders and this is a testament to those enormous pressures of politics. but it shows one of those reasons that has been

culturally downgraded. and behind that with the social care crisis of that weakening obligation so what the arguments people have to make is populations are shrinking. and then to make that card for those families in their brief reflection and then have a discussion so as this

is related to this ability point at least in the u. k the way but it is romanticizing talked about for those from the project or the counselor state to the diversity or the professional career only relatively small numbers of people could do that so if it is depressing for those who cannot make that huge leap for those small

progressions so with that anywhere class is about leaving your home town with those residential universities you have to lead in order to thrive they don't want to leave their like with it come from. or where they get their free child-care and with that british education and secretary. to the social mobility commission it is not a one

horse town and into have banned achieve a life. and as the way that secretary of education things that. so let me wind up. so sure of the day have some say what is going on and with the daily mail to reflect some wire in our world view so there are those issues where some

could say that influence has played the important role. and then to introduce those welfare caps but the fact they have been trying to bring down immigration because they think that is much too high a but that overwhelming domination so what do we do about it? so what are the grounds of the unexpected backlash? there is the reason why because 3 million people voted in the referendum of the

general elections to take the pollsters by surprise. because they said with some legitimacy of that double liberalism and and broadly accepted those reagan and thatcher reforms to have any consensus with the right one or the left cultural argument so they say what is the point of voting? so

that was a domestic argument that took a dramatic form for that old drug anywhere institution perhaps we could talk about this later it is illegal to discriminate with that freedom of movement. to provide those same level of services and access. but a couple of thoughts post britain and brexit that

we are the civilized people to give within an inch a and this is a disaster for those on the admonish to say we got this wrong. so now we experience this backlash has people have lashed out from their withdrawal to build that voice and at the moment to be so focused on those constituencies for districts and states to overwhelmingly vote to in large numbers that one of the crucial

things the way it argues about equality the racial gender have become separate to stronger repercussions in bad it is necessary to have both with good creatures invent and to feel more comfortable so with those common centers of interest anywhere liberalism makes people feel guilty but that does not have to mean that you dislike other people and then that whole argument has become too divided with

those value groups. so that is why with ethnic minorities one of those potential bridges between anywhere we're looking for those bridge issues. so they tend to be socially conservative for religious and and they have much stronger family connections with and that whole population is within 20 miles from when they were 14.

so there is an important role those to r.h. a trojan horse and that is another issue. so i was very impressed for the american and sociologists of the social democrats in economics of liberal in politics on social and cultural issues and that is the hidden majority no party will be

merged. with that last election and have tried to come close to that and then that tarnished that performance but there are places in the world that aren't balanced better than we are with the idea that germany is one but in the sense that doesn't have great global universities they claim that meddling has a greater value from those

political institutions with those great apprenticeships system and then i guess people prestige because of those lowest skilled jobs but even in the way that they talk with that combination in view speak have to reach -- half deutsche. action in one place in the world that most represents

this settlement is bavaria won a the richest parts of europe with that simple oath leader could. it is run by a very conservative party over the last several decades they've managed to be genuinely pluralistic. and it has not allowed to have enough sensitivity in with those cultural needs

being 20 or 25%. but i will stop there. thank you very much. [applause] >> walter russell will last a few questions as a distinguished fellow of the hudson institute and professor of foreign affairs of the humanities and editor at large of the american interest britain and america in the making of the modern world is the art of the covenant. >> so next year unfortunately we have known each other for quite awhile i have admired your work for a long time and i think with

this latest book that resonated in america that culture trump's economics in the united states. so we saw in the paper this morning virtually overruling the entire cabinet and to move bin that direction so culture trump's economics so that comes down to the question of the leaked failures -- elite failures of the university system in britain and the united states the elite is a bigger

percentage of the of population but it lacks that power journalism as an example of that older eve the. for those to do not share your privilege that is a symbol of this. so as long as they keep turning up it will be fined you don't have to go out there to keep downton abbey

going but you do feel under siege yourself and are more concerned with getting ahead with reflecting your duty that is focused on your career to some degree. that if i am better than anybody you are richer than anybody and also those people out there is the character defect and the bad choices. so to look at the elite failure as one of the key issues?.

>> that self regard in many of those are center-right. so they do have a failure of the but the but perhaps for all of those feelings have that connection. may become literally physically disconnected so low the elite used to employ them with the decline the physical production and that

is no longer there in the armed forces with the national institutions those value groups came together but that was eroded but they need a new language with those cognitive deletes and then to lurch into liberalism. but we don't want to sell the farm. in with those sources of dynamism. and then in the other direction we require anyone to do better.

the with those extraordinary events in 2016 to go on as normal. and did not do as well as expected. but on the contrary to see that as a warning sign. if we don't respond to the legitimate identifiers. >> it was a radical anti-democratic sense of meritocracy that to

genuinely believe in the equal worth of all people regardless of iq or social class and the equality of all people who judges equally into you are accountable for your treatment. and. >> and those qualities and with that gold standard to create new forms in to

reinforce that point that you made earlier. if anybody is out there would like to find it but in britain. nobody goes to a prestigious university. very few people go or have close friends or not graduates. so with as a divergence of of social networks and with dabble book -- bubble culture that is true in britain so you see that in

the contempt with left-wing professors that say without some kind of iq test. so that people have that high school friend or college friend you don't necessarily have the same social networks we have in the u.k.. but with what we are describing with brexit. >> did this and they never

come up? to different types of characteristics they were mobile and innovative and with financial fraud both had positive and negative and using the term group persistence. they could have those qualities than to be brutal. >> the circulation of the elite.

but a the bottom in the '30's. >> and now i will definitely look that up. the and 18th-century german does have some bearing with the most intimate community to have that more abstract and transactional. >> give your name and affiliation.

>> actually one of the greatest gifts of the world to be the translation may be the world will rediscover that. so to address that issue with that stratification of society. >> the ability -- biblically so to create gastritis back -- stratification of those elite so with that central

bank with the customs agents it seems they are too big to prosecute. it to trace this back historically. >> taking cues three is always a problem and with those financial fraud or problems i was not say right now but that was made by the drug money-laundering. >> i am steve buckingham.

it seems that i don't have a lot of experience with britain but i do think about the education bubble we have here in the united states. with economic and cultural turmoil may be part of the problem with that investment of education. and then to work their way to the london school of economics. and then those trend is on the british seaside been getting into investment and banking. with their own system with

more liberal policies and that is to make achievements with a livelihood. so it just appears education needs to be revalued. . .

dominates higher education,. dine next same manifesto he was proposing there he was also proposing not to unfreeze welfare benefits to the poor. jeremy corbyn's extreme leftist, i think by chance as much as design, the labor put together a very kind of pragmatic and appealing manifesto to a lot of different groups. i think the political classes will if a noticed the enormous popularity of this policy of the institutions. it's clearly an economically regresssive policy, although i

think that is one of the -- it's happened so relatively recently and quickly in the uk, the culture and critical power of oroide -- highed education -- this last election in britain brought it to the surface for the first time. we talked about the university, we have ought talked about university. used to enjust mean oxford and cambridge. now to 20% of the estates in the british parliament hayes students and staff from universities and also lots of generally speaking liberal-minded graduates who stay in certain towns and parts of towns. bristol west, not just -- brighton. you might say there's

anywhere-somewhere places. anywheres go to establish new roots, that -- anywheres generally don't -- they're not from -- they leave home but they find -- they become kind of rooted and established, and anywheres have as much group thinkers. often they're better educated. think the whole -- i mean, the mass-ification of higher education, i sometimes say, explaining brexit, say i blame the masses for brexit. mass immigration and mass higher education. have produced brexit. the two masses. >> okay. over here, the lady in the white jacket.

>> hello. thank you for coming. i'm cynthia butler, an attorney in town itch worked on a number of political campaigns. my question is what in the elite or the anywheres you're calling is there in the nature of sacred policy cows that we have here? sort of -- we've got things that the elites have wed themselves to that i believe the last election proved to be completely objectionable to large segments of religious people, for example. i would say our elite sacred cows are planned parenthood and borings and free immigration. we have things that people of an educated status would say are nonnegotiable. so what in the british value

scheme do they wed themselves to in the nature of sacred cows that have been policy-wise rejected. >> good question. immigration would certainly be one of the issues that is a kind of emblem. i don't have immigration -- we have had immigration become much more open in historically. haven't thought of ourselves as an immigration country. certainly we have had two great waves. the post colonial waves, in the late '40s and the '80s and '90s and a new surge when tony blair was elect net 1997 and then a new surge after 2004 when a lot of people from communist countries just joined the european union came to the uk. so we by circumstance unprecedented levels in recent years that has become one of the

central dividing lines. in this argument. it's social change more generally. the idea that social change, these are good things and this requires a very large amount of openness in your society, a large amount of fluidity which is something that anywheres find not comfortable but desirable and look down on the inability to kind of handle and ride change. but the other kind of liberal mainstream ideas. the european union was one of them, too much the european union seemed to crystallize that modern european openness, but of

course it did so at the price of reducing the democratic voice. now, a lot of somewheres have stop voting in elections because they felt things that faked -- affected their lives were imposed from the outside without any -- one of the key differences actually is the way in which -- in trade negotiations, global -- all of these global negotiations, anywheres are starting -- the assumption of anywheres is some sort of deal to further open up trade and goods and services and so on, movement to people, must inherently be a good thing and

we must come together -- a european argument -- come together in europe to negotiate and protect ourselves from the kind of global markets, and -- but i think to -- elites, even in my large definition of elites, the top 15%, 20% of the population, the understand that and see the rationale, and often benefits them, but to the nonelite, the cure is worse than the disease, or it's the same as the disease. poked around by browseles or -- bruce ups -- brussels or the global bond market doesn't make a difference. uk politics, minority integration is another one of those touchstones in terms of carrying about -- somewhere more

easily disturbed by the feeling that their towns have changed a lot. whole neighborhoods where people different to them live and they feel a bit anxious about it and there will be schools for entirely minority dominated, and to -- anywheres think, that's fine. that's the modern world. of course, people will cluster together. but they have less of a skins sense of a kind -- less of a sense of an ethnic identity. less of a sense of common norms and common way of life. they're less disturbed by the consequences of large scale immigration. >> let me sharpen that point a little bit. this is on immigration. just bring that out at bit. what struck me very -- when

freed -- fred siegel dirk was thinking of your comment in the book, you would get tremendous push back here from americans, talking about social cohesion and immigration and the assimilation of immigrants, and you said it would be easier essentially to same late 100,000 australians as opposed to 100,000 afghans. so that would get tremendous pushback here. this difference between the anywheres and the somewhere attitude, and i it makes a certain amount of sense what you're saying, a collection of social cohesion. maybe the did types of societies people come from do make a difference. the anywheres probably would say, how dare you even bring this up? the somewheres would say, well, this is common sense. we have the situation where gordon brown and the woman a

couple years back, getting a chance to think about this a little bit. >> a really good point. actually what it underlines is this -- it's a return to this different attitude to groups and group identities, and the liberals -- the left tend to -- they tend to be groupists when it comes to economics. believe in social class but when it comes to culture and society, the left, at least in britain and much of europe, comes highly individualistic. it's a collection of individuals. we're all just individuals indio what difference can it make to have another 100,000 people from -- it's radically different

from an economic lens or cultural lens. they're almost saying there's no such thing as society when it comes to peoples, and how easily or difficult peoples and cultures and ethnicities and that kind of stuff and they can genuine by believe -- it's easier to integrate 100,000 australians than 100,000 afghans. language, culture, way of life, are immediately shared in certain respects witch australians in a way they're not with afghans. 1 hon thousand afghans can assimilate but obviously common sense, will take longer and a more friction, filled difficult process. >> gentleman right here. >> yes.

bryan marshall. in british value is would think there would be some concern about the fact that the country has been governed for a long period by the eu parliament and much of the legislation coming from outside the country, and considerable extent. i would think that would be a major problem in the united states, and i've not heard very much about that being a concern in britain. is that the case? seems like most of the discussion has been relating to immigration. >> no. it has been -- there has long been a substantial minority of people who have objected very strongly to the erosion of sovereignty that represented by the european union. we have willingly given up powers to this body, in the same

we we do with others, global -- with nato, but what happened particularly since the 1980s and the 1990s, the european union has been a remarkable success story in many ways. in the 1990s, the success went to its head, at the end of the cold war. the law period in brussels. it rushed ahead with a political rather than economic euro. introduced this concept over european citizenship, which subsequently made it so difficult to control freedom of movement. not only did we have large numbers of people coming, but when they arrived that had to be treated in exactly the same way as british citizens, which offended against a common-sense motion that most persons would have, at british people, and germans, of citizen favoritism.

a national system should be first the cue for public goods. -- first in the queue, and the overrapid enlargement of the european union, we're leaving the european union because of enlargement. we were the country that promoted enlarge. because we thought it would dilute the integrating force in the european union, but now you say substantially because of the -- i think it's -- the role of marvin is -- parliament is very important. post 9/11 immigration, quite a few people came from the late '40s to the '80s, '90,people from the four colonies, caribbean, africa, india, and pakistan, and there was some friction that begrudgingly we came used to be a multiethnic, multiracial society, but in the '80s and '90sening politics,

governments, were able to respond to the anxiety people felt. bring the up numbers down. by in thearm '90s, immigration was negative. moment peer were leaving than coming -- more people were leaving than coming and that was proper response and made it easier to absorb the newcomers when the numbers were relatively low. after 2004, when we had the great surge from eastern europe, people suddenly realized that our parliament could do nothing about it because it was a set of rule wed signed up joining the european union. it was not a big deal between 2004 but sudden lay lot of poor countries joined, we were the only big country to allee immediate access to the labor market so we were strongly hit by big wave of people. and people realized that something is basic and

existential as who comes in your country and what quantity, we weren't able to affect and this is true across a whole range of issues then cure is so often worse than the disease. the whole point of the country, they have different kind of natural preferences on things, different natural prefer presences, different changes on your attitude to risk, say, whether it's financial products or gm crops. britts and the americans disagree about these things and we have countries where it's okay to disagree. but when you join a club -- actually a replies to the wto, when you join a club like the european union, all these national preferences are harder to impose. you have -- come to some sort of messy compromise. it may be worth doing that if the reward is big enough. you're really all getting richer

and it works, but there was a feeling with the european union we were sacrificeing national sovereignty and not get enough back in return. >> there were the fourth row, there's -- >> i'm a student from london. how much where you argue that political language and our media has more of a say in our electoral vote and political participation than background political context and identity. >> the media plays a bigger role than -- participation than background political expiated context. >> oh, well, i think the media have -- me media have a very interesting role in this argue;

-- argument and possibly part over the solution. we have had a narrowing of our political culture in the last two or three generations, background of mps, more and more similar. a much more political, political class, people who worked, interns and special advisers who become congressmen and senators and so on. so you -- and you have seen a very -- you hear in my talk, narrow offering the political ideology as well. and yet there's a big countervailing politics which is the internet, which is the kind of somewhere trolls are somehow now released. the kind of elite filters of political communication have been completely blown away and it's veryugly, and your own

president -- it's kind of messy but it is giving a voice to people who didn't have a voice before. they felt they didn't have a voice. i think it's too early to tell how that media revolution, very -- this sort of populist democratic media revolution is going to play out. i think some ways -- one could see this as kind of optimistic development. in the sort term its certainly becomes -- made the tone of politics uglier, but the people -- it's a bit like populist parties in europe. many populist parties in europe have been in governments as minorities and coalitions. it's kind of civilized them.

not in all cases but the things party in finland, it's had to compromise in government, as one of the coalition parties, lost a lot of public support but learn that politic is is about difficult tradeoffs and can't have simple populist programs that are -- you change your behavior when you're faced will reality, and that's been civilizing influence on european populism. might say the same thing about the new media -- the fact that everybody can be a publisher, everybody can have their own newspaper. anybody can set up a blog or tweet or say things on facebook that a lot of other people might listen to. that democratization of communication, because we're in the early stages it's messy and

ugly but you may see that the trolls becoming responsible people like my colleagues on platform. >> role model for trolls. >> thank you, david. >> two down. >> i'm a student aunt al bin school of public service. something i noticed in united states -- not sure if the same is true for britain -- recently we have seen a lot of i guess what you call the anywheres or certain groups of anywheres kind of using antiintellectualism or anti-expert sentedments as a scapegoat and harnessing that to gain populist influence. you mentioned in your talk there are certain bridges we might be able to use to find compromise between the value systems and i was wondering if you thought we

could every kind of reconcile that antiintellectualist sentiment. >> did you mean that they're using -- who is using the antiintellectual sentiment? that was my dish didn't quite understand that. how do you see that? >> for example, with the past election, i guess we would all consider, say, president trump as an anywhere, but i think he was very successful in kind of harnessing the populist sendment -- sentiment. that's more what i was referring to. >> well, the statement during the brexit campaign by mike michael, a leading british politician who said the people are fed up with experts. he said that sympathetically. and i think what he meant was that -- obviously we're not fed up with experts who keep the air

planes flying or engineers and scientists, but the media is dominated by people who are not hard scientists, people who are journalists or commentators or academics in political science or whatever, and they are not neutral. invariably they have agendas. they have lots of facts and figures at their fingertipped but they're not neutral, but i think it's also true that what we're seeing is a kind -- we have seen in the last generation this kind of final eradication of politics of defer -- deference in our society. in britain, you go back a few decades and there was more kind

of structure and deference in politics. i think that the erosion of that is in some ways a good thing. definitely not on the whole of valuable sentiment, at fleece a democracy. democracy should be more def rein shall in many ways but -- deferencal. that spirit spills over into any kind of -- for any form of authority, any kind of intellectual authority, any kind of -- just because somebody has studied the subject for ten years, don't care, feel differently about it, and the much greater importance that people attach to sentiment and feeling and emotion, again, being reinforced by the internet revolution in many ways.

my feelings are that i'm wright and you're wrong even though you have a bunch of letters after your name. even allowing they have the their own buy biases may mean they know more about the issue. >> a wealthy person who is a leader of a populist cause, franklin roosevelt, julius caesar, so this has been throughout history. the gentleman way in the last row. >> james, retired. david, you mentioned that germany, quote, no great universities, great technical institutions. i have taught at munich and they tell me -- i think they're right -- they teach at great universities. what are we missing? >> yes. they have great technical universities. they do not have great -- just look at the lists that are

produced. the global university dominate the u.s. and -- [inaudible] >> germany has great technical universities. but it doesn't have great general global universities. [inaudible] >> yes. of course they are. with the exception of technical universities, but the broader based, general universities, as it were, doesn't really exist in -- looks like heidelberg does not attract huge flows of international students. >> ed did. >> or the 19th century. >> germany did lion lead and it's also a deliberate model of policy. the government doesn't stream large amount of money so its doesn't have a oxnard and cambridge or harvard and yale. >> elite children in germany

come here or britain for the higher education. >> this gentleman and then you after that. >> my name is jerald patrick, a student at the school of public service. seems we're seeing a global trend in the rise of big men, be it a president in the fill finds, president trump here,ers juan. how doee feel the kassim between -- chasm. >> inpatients of being governorred by institutions and they want to be governed by people. they want a face on power. you can see that in china where after the death of mao they tried deliberately to move away from a personalistic system, but i think the threat that -- was

able to raise scared them and you see xi jinping is behaving much more like an emperor than like the chairman of a committee. and this is, i think, -- it's partly a result of a kind of disenter mediation through the internet of institutions and politics. one other point to make here about the relationship of the elites and nonelites is that nonelites these days feel a heck of a lot better and are a lot better educated than nonelite used to be, so that in 1920, the average school leaving age in the u.s. might have been eighth grade, 15 years old. today you have many more people going through many more levels of education, and they simply -- and even in the u.s., many people going through two years of post secondary education, who don't go all the way -- they don't actually feel they need

upper middle class professionals to tell them how to do x and y and z. they kind of think they know already, and you also have earlier in the 20th century, with many people migrating from rural area to the urban areas anded was notes what you grew up with and and you look to the professional teachers and the public officials how to behave. you're now at home in this and yet these people, if anything, they're boxier than ever. they have new ideas about child-raising, new things about carseats or always coming up with new ways to tell you how to live better. >> represented by hillary clinton. >> so there's a pushback on that. we have time for two quick questions.

>> he's next. >> dave, you made an interesting opinion -- >> give your name. >> i'm jeff and i work for an investment company. you made an interesting point, at least to me, with respect to experience, and you said that there's a distinct difference between an individual with experience than a person that literally can create an idea and n15 minutes or so. and if somehow my analogy is sort of the self-made man is viewed as a myth nothing some respects -- mythology in some respects, given a lot of credit versus -- take the dow jones here in the united states and some respects where there are very few companies on the dow jones that are 20 years old or so.

so that type of experience sort of is gone. if you can relate that. the type of experience versus the instant, as walter said here, with respect to the instant expertise that one can have just by getting 15 minutes on the internet. >> yeah. when i talked about experience i was talking more about status and the kind of jobs that require a lot of experience to do well, and not necessarily -- you didn't have to be very smart to do the job, but a smart person coming off the street couldn't easily do it, and i think the disappearance of those jobs has helped to drain away status in respect and wreck dismission you might say social

honor to use an old fashioned phrase, from a lot of occupations, and what you say is a narrative of that. the kind of smart, geeky kid that produced all these massive digital companies, and that is a sort of analogy in the dow jones, indeed in the industrial structure. how they will sort of settle down -- there are certain -- probably certain jobs in facebook, amazon, microsoft, google, that are protected like that. don't know enough about that world. but i think part of that -- the general shift of admiring and esteeming cognitive ability before other qualities. those other qualities that we

need to sustain still. things that everybody can sort of play that game. the trouble is -- 50% thief population are always in the bottom half of the cognitive ability spectrum, and you -- it's kind of -- some ways in -- to stress cognitivity above anything else. >> how do you explain when either scotland or ireland have any interest in joining england in brexit? >> it was a -- an anglo welch vote, and people talk it as

being a kind of english revolt, a revolt of the english, perhaps the last great act of the english working class, and there is some truth in that, think. partly because there is a kind of legitimate resentment to add to all the other resentments, if you like, about the kind of downplaying of the english interests in the new arrangements that emerged in the last couple of decade, a much greater voice, scottish parliament, same in wales, and the feeling that the english subsidized these places and don't have their own voice. now, the problem is it's very rick because that's such asymmetry and the english population is a 5 million, the so issuing population is 8 million, the welsh population is 3%.

we're the big bear in the bed. when we roll over, everyone is is squashed. a necessary element of self-restraints but that kind of self-restraint it not popular in a populist age and the english have been slightly rebelling against its. would say nearly 40% of those in scotland voted to leave. and 40% of the anymore london voted to leave. these two great centers -- all of the places that -- the places that were the most leave voting areas, like west midlands in the northeast of england, also had very large remain votes and so everywhere was pretty mixed actually. and there was a bias in

scotland, as in london, and there might be -- there's an element of -- not exactly anti-englishness but given that scott land is run by the scottish national party, has been trying leave the united kingdom, there is a feeling that -- they prefer to be ruled by brussel than by london. historic resentments and being the little guy in the context of the united kingdom, but i think the last election has shown that there is no appetite now for a second referendum in scotland. the conservative party did much bert than expected in scotland, people are beginning to tire of the fmp and the fact that it is much harder for scotland to be

independent when britain is outside the european union. if we were both inside the european union, it would have been very much easier for scotland. i think the costs, economic and otherwise, rise quite dramatically imi don't expect there to be a second referendum anytime soon. >> following england has never been an irish goal. >> one reason they -- yeah. the euro right away. >> island -- dish -- ireland decided to get out of the bed completely rather than being squashed by the big english bear, and other commentators complain about the irresponsible way in which the english or the anglo welch are now jeopardizing the good friday agreement and the open border between northern

ireland and southern ireland. i mean, i think it's pretty unrealistic to expect english voters to place 55 million english voter. you really think 55 million voter tosspots pan anxiety been a complicated border situation in island which they don't understand any, before their fundamental desire for a return to national sovereignty? i think that you're judging the english by unfair standards, if you are saying that. by a standard we don't apply anybody else. certainly don't apply it to the smaller nations of the united kingdom, and i think there's good will, a way round will be found to -- maybe the people of northern island will have to have some sort of border checks when they come to the main expands that will be unpop floor northern ireland and perhaps the irish government, if they worry

so much, we can have british customs officials working with irish custom officials on the irish border, or a combination of the two things. i think it's an unfair to expect the english to suppress their interests. [inaudible] >> i don't mean to be rudes but if i may, you have said nothing also about the differences between irish culture, scottishing culture, irish education, irish education, with the english experience and how that broader argument fits in with your general positions on brexit.

>> many subject wes have not had time to discussion and they need remain that way. [applause] [inaudible conversations] >> book of the visit capitol hill to ask members of congress what they're reading this summer. >> love reading history about our president and the library of congress has a series where every so often they bring in the author of a book on one of the presidents. the last one we had, last week, happened to be on andrew jackso